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RESÜMEE
Nach dem Ende der japanischen Besatzung der Philippinen 1945 wurden dort Prozesse zur 
Verfolgung von Kriegsverbrechen und von Landesverrat initiiert. Während im ersten Fall eine 
universalistische Kategorie von Verbrechen zur Strafe stand, ging es im zweiten Fall meist um 
den Verrat an der Nation, die als Opfer de!niert wurde. Im Januar 1948 erklärte Manuel Roxas 
eine Präsidialamnestie für alle des Landesverrats Beschuldigten mit Ausnahme von Kollabora-
teuren aus dem Militär und der Polizei, Spionen, Informanten und gewalttätiger Verbrechen 
Beschuldigter. Die meisten der Fälle von Landesverrat, die diese Amnestie nicht umfasste, be-
trafen Personen, die Formen von Gräuel begangen hatte, die in Prozessen gegen Japaner als 
Kriegsverbrechen eingestuft wurden. Dieser Artikel untersucht den Prozess der gerichtlichen 
Aufarbeitung von Gewaltverbrechen und sexueller Gewalt, meist begangen durch Kollabora-
teure aus dem Militär und der Polizei, in den Philippinen nach 1945 gemäß dem Gesetz gegen 
Verrat. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, inwiefern – ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass die Kriegs-
verbrecherprozesse der frühen Nachkriegszeit den Erwartungen in vielerlei Form nicht ent-
sprachen – die alternative Kategorisierung von Brutalität im Krieg als Landesverrat nicht auch 
hochproblematisch war.
Introduction
After the Second World War, prosecutors and judges of war crimes tribunals in Nurem-
berg and Tokyo, as well as in military tribunals and national courts around the world, 
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faced the accused in the name of humanity.1 At the same time as Allied courts were 
adding new universal crimes to a roster listing violations of the rules of war, a parallel 
process of legal and extralegal retribution was being carried out against those accused of 
committing one of the oldest of crimes of betrayal, treason. Like the wartime leaders of 
the Axis nations, who were convicted for the crimes of underlings who followed their 
direct commands and carried out their policies, many of those accused of treason were 
powerful figures who served more or less reluctantly in brutal regimes established under 
military occupation. !ey often led security organs responsible for widespread torture 
and atrocities, or else were complicit in their violence through a failure to rein them in. 
Under the Japanese wartime occupation of the Philippines, from late 1941 to 1945, these 
included officials and local elites who worked with a “Philippine Executive Commission” 
and later served the Philippine Republic, which that was granted nominal independence 
by the Japanese in 1943. Others among the accused were at the bottom of the power 
hierarchy but confronted or participated in the daily violence of the Japanese occupa-
tion at close proximity, serving as auxiliaries, as soldiers, as informants, or in police and 
constabulary units. By an accident of birth, those who faced retribution were punished, 
for the most part, under the laws and rhetoric of treason rather than for committing the 
universal crimes represented in the world’s war crimes tribunals. 
!is article explores the process of trying the atrocities and sexual violence of military 
and constabulary collaborators with the 1941–1945 Japanese occupation of the Phil-
ippines under the law of treason and finds that, if early war crimes trials of the early 
postwar period fell short in many ways, punishing the brutality of war as betrayal was a 
deeply troubled alternative. !ese were Filipino citizens who, during the war, were called 
upon to carry out acts of extreme violence. !ese acts were justified as acts of sacrifice 
carried out in defense of both an Asian order their occupiers claimed to be the only bul-
wark against the injustices of Western imperialism, and on behalf of the new Philippine 
republic established under occupation. When the Philippines returned to American con-
trol and was once again granted independence in 1946, these same acts were denounced 
as examples of barbarity that breached universal laws. In the Philippine courts that tried 
them, however, it was more important to demonstrate disloyalty and betrayal than es-
tablish the scale and nature of their brutality in order to secure their convictions not for 
war crimes, but treason. !e identity of the accused thus determined their crimes, while 
the prewar law of treason they were tried under defined the victim of their betrayal to be 
against not one, but two nation-states: a Philippine commonwealth that technically no 
longer existed, and the United States, the very colonial power a new Philippine republic 
was struggling to establish independence from.
1 In the Asia-Paci!c, the most well known of these were the trials held under the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo Trials. See Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional 
Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremburg Legacy (London; New York: Routledge, 2008) and Yuma Totani, The 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia 
Center, 2009). 
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!e 1940s was a decade that saw many claims of liberation and independence in the 
Philippines. On the eve of the Japanese invasion of the archipelago in December 1941, 
the Philippines was an American colony that exercised limited autonomy under its Com-
monwealth President Manuel Quezon. Filipinos had been promised full independence 
by 1946 under the terms of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, but the arriving Japanese 
declared themselves agents of liberation come to help Filipinos cast off Western impe-
rialism. Working closely with pre-occupation elites, who cooperated with the Japanese 
through a newly established Executive Commission and later a nominally independent 
Philippine Republic, the occupation authorities faced increasing resistance from a variety 
of U.S. supported, as well as independent, guerrilla forces.2 Many of these groups radi-
cally increased the scale of their raids and the harassment of occupation forces after the 
return of U.S. forces in 1944. 
!e violence of the occupation itself is most memorably associated with the horrifying 
fate of surrendered Philippine and American soldiers in the Bataan Death March in the 
spring of 1942, the increasingly brutal counter-insurgency campaign of the Japanese 
military and its allies, and the atrocities of desperate Japanese forces defending Manila, 
especially in February, 1945.3 War crimes associated with all of these atrocities would be 
the subject of trials of Japanese soldiers and officers after the war.4 !e collaboration of 
Filipinos with the Japanese occupation was handled separately. Formal investigations of 
collaborators were carried out by Counter-Intelligence Corps units attached to returning 
U.S. forces. !e files related to these investigations were transferred to the Philippine 
government for use in treason trials of a newly established People’s Court from late 1945. 
!e resulting treason trials resulted in almost no convictions of major wartime officials 
and have received only limited attention from historians.5 
In accounting for, and justifying, the leniency of the process, later historical accounts 
have tended to emphasize the colonial status of the Philippines and have juxtaposed the 
collaboration with the Japanese alongside the longstanding collaboration of Filipinos 
2 On the often complex local dynamics of resistance and collaboration, see Alfred W. McCoy “‘Politics By Other 
Means’: World War II in the Western Visayas, Philippines” in Alfred W. McCoy, ed., Southeast Asia Under Japanese 
Occupation (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980) and Satoshi Ara, “Collaboration and 
Resistance: Catalino Hermosilla and the Japanese Occupation of Ormoc, Leyte (1942–1945),” Philippine Studies: 
Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints 60(1) (2012): 33–68.
3 The most straightforward overview of the fall and recapture of the Philippines is still the U.S. o!cial military hi-
story, Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, CMH Pub 5-10 (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, 
U.S. Army, 1991).
4 In the Philippines, war crimes were tried in U.S. military trials and later in Philippine courts. See Richard L. Lael, 
The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 
1982), Sharon Williams Chamberlain, Justice and Reconciliation: Postwar Philippine Trials of Japanese War Cri-
minals in History and Memory (Ph.D., United States, DC: The George Washington University, 2010) and Hitoshi 
Nagai, Firipin to tainichi senpan saiban 1945-1953 [The War Crimes Trials and Japan-Philippines Relations, 1945-
1953] (Tôkyô: Iwanami Shoten, 2010).
5 The treason trials in the Philippines, at least up to 1948, are treated in Augusto V. de Viana, Kulaboretor!: The Issue 
of Political Collaboration During World War II (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Pub. House, 2003) and David 
Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). 
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with American rule.6 In political debates and during the trials that followed Japanese 
defeat, however, the debate was rarely framed in post-colonial terms. Instead, wartime 
leaders of the Philippines leaned heavily upon the same two arguments, that local allies 
of military occupations employed around the world in their trials after the Second World 
War, from France to China: the “shield” defense, which claimed that collaboration miti-
gated the violence of the occupier, and the “double game” defense, which claimed that 
patriotic collaborators feigned allegiance to the enemy while secretly supplying aid to 
the resistance.7 
!ese approaches achieved unparalleled success in the special Philippine People’s Courts 
for crimes of treason committed during the occupation set up in September, 1945, 
especially when combined with a compromised judiciary and weak support from the 
early postwar government of President Manuel Roxas. !e crippled process is usually 
described as ending with a presidential amnesty signed by president Roxas as Proclama-
tion Number 51, on January 28, 1948. !e amnesty provided official validation for the 
“shield” defense, arguing that wartime collaborators believed in the necessity of their 
wartime roles. In the words of the amnesty, it “was their patriotic duty to execute them 
in the interest of the safety and well-being of their countrymen who were then at the 
mercy of the enemy” and they “did everything in their power to minimize the atrocities 
of the enemy…”8 
!e amnesty was not universal, however, declaring that, the “public sentiment” favor-
ing mercy did “not extend to persons who voluntarily took up arms against the alleged 
nations or the members of the resistance forces, or acted as spies or informers of the 
enemy, or committed murder, arson, coercion, robbery, physical injuries or any other 
crime defined and punished in our penal laws.”9 Anyone accused of these crimes would 
continue to face charges of treason, together with other crimes of violence, even after the 
dismantlement of the People’s Court system.
When the Philippine legislature debated the presidential amnesty in February, 1948, it 
was this contrast between the collaboration of the occupation’s governing elite and the 
informers and military collaborators that dominated the discussion. Was it fair, they 
asked, to punish thousands of largely poor and lower level collaborators who were at 
the site of the massacres, while exempting everyone higher up in the wartime apparatus? 
!e legislature eventually ratified the amnesty by a large majority, but the trials of those 
6 See, for example, Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years; Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45 (Quezon 
City: R.P. Garcia Pub. Co, 1965) and Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Jorge B. Vargas, The Burden of Proof: The Vargas-
Laurel Collaboration Case (Manila: University of the Philippines Press for the U.P.-Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana Re-
search Center, 1984).
7 For more on the framing of the treason debate in the Philippine legislature after the war see Konrad M. Lawson, 
Wartime Atrocities and the Politics of Treason in the Ruins of the Japanese Empire 1937-1953 (Ph.D., United 
States, MA: Harvard University, 2012), 166-209. 
8 Republic of Philippines “Proclamation No. 51 – A Proclamation Granting Amnesty” (January 28, 1948) http://
www.gov.ph/1948/01/28/proclamation-no-51-2/ (accessed 12 January, 2013).
9 Ibid.
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who remained would reveal the challenges of punishing atrocities and wartime violence 
through trials dominated by the charge of treason.
Military Collaboration in the Philippines
Who were the Filipinos who faced potential prosecution even after the 1948 amnesty? 
In the Philippines the two best known sources of armed support for Japanese occupation 
were the Bureau of Constabulary, which operated from around mid-1942 to its collapse 
as an (in)effective fighting force in the fall of 1944, and the League of Patriotic Filipi-
nos, known by its abbreviated Tagalog name Makapili (Tagalog: Kalipunang Makabayan 
ngmga Pilipino, in Japanese: firipin aikoku dôshi kai), which was founded in November 
1944 and lasted until the collapse of the Japanese occupation in the summer of 1945. 
"ere was also a number of other organizations, often with overlapping memberships.10
"e term Makapili referred to a concrete organization likely to number only a few thou-
sand at most, but it was only one among many employed by the Japanese military in 
its final months on the archipelago. Increasingly, Makapili became a catch-all reference 
for those seen as the most enthusiastic lackeys of the Japanese occupation. At least one 
Japanese unit described their Makapili as an “assassination group”, though it is likely 
they carried out a variety of tasks, including labor.11 In memoirs and histories of the Phil-
ippine occupation the word invokes horror, and is often associated, rightly or wrongly, 
with masked “magic eye” informers who pointed out suspected guerrillas to Japanese 
patrols.12
"e largest and best, if still poorly equipped, force under arms in the occupied Philip-
pines was the Bureau of Constabulary (BoC). "e BoC, or just the Constabulary as it was 
more frequently called, was in many ways the successor to the Philippine Constabulary it 
was modeled upon, which had a long prewar history dating back to 1901.13 Indeed, two 
10 The Yôin (??) is occasionally mentioned, although its members were most often engaged as laborers along 
the lines of the various auxiliaries that Japan employed all over occupied territories, often termed heiho (??). 
This organization was known to Filipinos, by a coincidence of pronunciation, as “United Nippon.” On various 
organizations that sometimes provided armed assistance to the Japanese in the !nal stage of the war, such 
as those under Aurelio Alvero and Artemio Ricarte, see Motoe Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” 
in Setsuho Ikehata and Ricardo Trota Jose, eds., The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction 
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 88-90 and Grant Goodman “Aurelio Alvero: Traitor or 
Patriot?” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 95–103.
11 Description of Makapili in captured Japanese Naval Defense Force Headquarters report, translated by Allied 
Translator and Interpreter Service (4 February 1945), Claude M. Owens Papers, Box 2, Hoover Library, Stanford, 
California.
12 For more on memories of the Makapili and the “magic eye” see Konrad M. Lawson, Wartime Atrocities and the 
Politics of Treason, 193-196. 
13 The most detailed history of the Philippine Constabulary and related organs in the pre- and post-war periods, 
though not during the war, is Alfred W. McCoy Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and 
the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). On the wartime constabulary 
see Ricardo Trota Jose, Captive Arms: The Constabulary Under the Japanese, 1942-1944 (Manila: University of the 
Philippines, College of Social Sciences, 1997).
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prewar heads of the Constabulary, Jose de los Reyes and Guillermo B. Francisco, were 
each made director, in turn, of its Japanese sponsored equivalent. !e BoC was, however, 
structured somewhat differently from its predecessor in that it included all local police, 
and its military aspects were deliberately toned down by the Japanese military adminis-
tration until the founding of the Republic in 1943.14 !e organization was established 
in early 1942, but it did not truly get off the ground until after the surrender of Bataan 
in April, when a large number of Philippine prisoners of war, many of them with prewar 
Constabulary experience, fell into Japanese hands.15 
!e BoC was never designed to fight alongside Japanese soldiers across its far-flung bat-
tlefronts in the manner of the Indian National Army that fought alongside the Japanese 
in Burma and across the border into India.16 Instead they were to defend the homeland, 
carry out policing duties, and crush resistance to Japanese rule. !e members of the 
BoC for the most part refused to fight the returning Americans in the fall of 1944 and 
deserted in large numbers; its total strength dropped from 18,000 in August to 7,500 
in December before the Constabulary was completely disarmed in the spring of 1945.17 
Like Japan’s local allies in occupied China, and others throughout its occupied territo-
ries, BoC officers did indeed widely engage in a “double game” before their mass deser-
tion in 1944.18 Even when they did serve, the ineffectual patrols of the BoC were usually 
preferred by the resistance to the more attentive ones by the Japanese. 
At the same time it was equally clear that, prior to the fall of 1944, the BoC was in-
creasingly active in Japanese-led mopping up operations and general “pacification” cam-
paigns carried out at the behest of the Japanese military, or by order of other Filipino 
government officials.19 A U.S. G-2 military intelligence report, which recorded the high 
potential of the BoC to turn on the Japanese, also noted their responsibility for the 
deaths of USAFFE guerrillas and that “to a limited extent” they had been employed as 
“undercover agents and spies” by the Japanese.20 Japanese activity reports on mopping-
up work collected by the American forces, while slim on details, are full of references to 
punitive raids being carried out, “in cooperation with the police,” “aided by the police,” 
14 Jose, Captive Arms, 3-7. Military ranks were restored after the independence of the Republic.
15 Most of the remainder were United States Armed Forces in the Far East soldiers who had served in either the 
prewar Philippine Division or the Philippine Scouts.
16 For an overview of the various armies that fought on Japan’s side see Joyce Lebra-Chapman, Japanese-Trained 
Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977).
17 Jose, Captive Arms, 18. On the desertions of the BC from around September, 1944, see also Elmer Norton Lear, 
The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941–1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 217. Then 
Foreign Minister Claro Recto claims that President Laurel, aware of the desertions, allowed up to 75% of Consta-
bulary o!cers to freely desert. Claro M. Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation, 56.
18 See for example Ray C. Hunt and Bernard Norling, Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philip-
pines (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 107.
19 Jose, Captive Arms, 7. Manuel E. Buenafe, Wartime Philippines (Manila: Philippine Education Foundation, 1950), 
226.
20 General HQ United States Army Forces, Paci"c Military Intelligence Section, General Sta# Intelligence Activities 
in the Philippines during the Japanese Occuaption: Documentary Appendices Volume II Intelligence Series, „G-2 
Information Bulletin: Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands“ (June 1943), 29.
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and “working [in] conjunction with the police unit.”21 For this reason, it should not have 
been surprising to see them well represented in trials for the atrocities of treason in the 
aftermath of the war. 
Trials After Amnesty
!e vast majority of accused Filipino traitors were dismissed for lack of evidence and 
other technicalities, even before the 1948 amnesty and the dismantlement of the People’s 
Court. Of the cases which remained, some convictions were appealed to the Philippine 
Supreme Court, and the rulings of at least 157 cases are readily accessible in numerous 
Supreme Court digests and legal databases.22 Historians of the treason trial process Au-
gusto V. de Viana and David J. Steinberg both claim that less than 1% of People’s Court 
treason cases were tried and reached conviction during the time of its existence, but it is 
not known how many of the remaining untried cases that were turned over to courts of 
first instance resulted in convictions of the same crime. !e 156 convictions in their own 
count of cases, up to 1948, is extremely close in number to the count of 157 Supreme 
Court rulings I have identified, but it is less than half of the 323 wartime collaborators 
who would eventually receive a pardon in 1953. A closer examination of cases in the 
lower courts after 1948 would be necessary to fully compare post-amnesty conviction 
rates with those of the People’s Courts up until they were dismantled. 
!e majority of the post-amnesty treason cases in the Philippines worked their way 
through the regular criminal courts from 1948 to 1953, during the most violent period 
of postwar Philippine history. !ey continued through an increasingly violent insur-
gency known as the Huk rebellion, through elections plagued by corruption and the 
conclusion of the Philippine war crimes trials of accused Japanese in 1949. !ey con-
tinued through the suspension of habeas corpus under presidential emergency powers in 
1950, through the sudden and controversial execution of over half a dozen Japanese war 
criminals in January 1951, the rural reconstruction movement of 1952, and the dramatic 
suppression of the Huk insurgents under the then Secretary of National Defense, Ramon 
Magsaysay.23 
Well over half of treason cases ruled upon by the Philippine Supreme Court, some 92 
in total, involved an accused member of the occupation period Bureau of Constabu-
21 The term “police” refers to the BoC, since the two were essentially merged by the Japanese by wartime. These 
examples are taken from a collection of translated mopping up reports from early 1944. See: General Head-
quarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Sta!, Allied Translator and Interpeter Section, 
South West Paci"c Area Current Translations No. 146 (January 31, 1945).
22 I have depended mostly on the copies of these rulings in the searchable Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence Da-
tabank, created by the Arellano Law Foundation, which is a non-pro"t institution specializing in legal education. 
http://lawphil.net/, hereafter LawPhil.
23 On this period see H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines, First Edition. (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1992), 227-248 and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: a Study of Peasant Revolt in 
the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
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lary (BoC), an alleged member of the organization known as the Makapili, Philippine 
employees of the Japanese military police, a “United Nippon” auxiliary member (yôin), 
a member of the Coastal Defense Corps (CDC, kaigun jiyûtai), or other unidentified 
uniformed military collaborator. 
Table 1: Supreme Court Rulings on Military Collaboration 1947–195924
Organization
No. of Cases 
(% of 157 total 
treason cases)
Affirmed Convictions 
(% of 92 military 
collaboration cases)
Reclusion per-
petua or Death 
(% of 83 convictions)
Bureau of 
Constabulary 13 (8.3%) 9 (69.2%)
7 (77.8%, inc. 1 
death sent.)
Makapili 48 (30.6%) 44 (91.7%) 37 (84.1%, inc. 1 death sent.)
Other  
Organizations 31 (19.7%) 30 (96.8%) 21 (70%)
Total Mil. 
Collaborators 92 (58.6%) 83 (90.2%) 63 (75.9%)
For years after the defeat of Japan, the Supreme Court was an awkward institution to 
deliberate upon the issue of collaboration. Five of its eleven early postwar members had 
served in the occupation government in some capacity, and three of its members, Ramon 
Ozaeta, Ricardo Paras, and Manuel V. Moran had served on the Supreme Court in the 
wartime republic.25 In the postwar period the Supreme Court would be the final arbiter 
of state retribution in a host of violent crimes. As we examine their handling of cases 
involving wartime atrocities, however, it is important to note that the slow moving legal 
machine of the Philippines worked side-by-side with other legal and extralegal forms of 
political retribution. At the same time the Supreme Court was handing down rulings on 
leading cases of military collaboration and atrocities committed by traitors, a new rebel-
lion by the most powerful wartime guerrillas, the Hukbalahap, was brewing on the plains 
of Luzon. Summary justice in the field, which reigned on all sides during the Japanese 
occupation, or in special military courts, together created an expansive space for violence 
against, and by, various insurgent groups that has continued, not only during the occu-
pation and early postwar but, to a greater or lesser degree, down to the present day. 
For this reason, it is not terribly surprising if the unusual characteristics and legalistic 
complexities of postwar treason trials, and especially the more invisible post-amnesty 
trials, have escaped the historian’s notice. Nonetheless, as we shall see, the Philippine 
24 Statistics compiled by the author from rulings at LawPhil.
25 The other members with service in the occupation period were Cesar Bengzon and Manuel Briones. See 
Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), 82.
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Supreme Court’s treatment of murder as treason, and denying sexual crimes in war their 
political nature, both capture the legal and political field of moral calculation regarding 
wartime atrocities in the early postwar, and they reveal the difficulty in employing pros-
ecutions for a crime against the nation as the means to punish atrocities in war.
Complex Crimes and the Atrocities of Treason
In almost all of its rulings on wartime treason convictions, the Supreme Court corrected 
judges of the People’s Court or courts of first instance, which had combined allegations 
of treason with murder or other violent crimes to charge the accused of having commit-
ted a “complex crime.” "e lower courts frequently ruled that military collaborators, 
informers, and spies were guilty of treason on the one hand and, separately, of violent 
crimes on the other. When these were compounded as “complex crimes” as defined by 
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, conviction guaranteed that the 
maximum penalty for the heavier crime would be given, which resulted in a relatively 
large number of death sentences before appeal to the Supreme Court. "us, a military 
collaborator who joined a Japanese patrol and, say, beat or tortured an individual or 
robbed suspected guerrillas was, if convicted of the “complex crime” of treason and mur-
der, automatically given the maximum penalty for treason: a death sentence. 
"e Supreme Court rejected this argument in case after case, usually referring to the 
precedent established by People vs. Prieto, a ruling issued the very day after the amnesty 
for political collaborators, on January 29, 1948.26 In this case, Eduardo Prieto was ac-
cused of being an agent of the Japanese military police, who participated in raids on sus-
pected guerrillas, of torturing suspects, himself bayonetting two guerrillas to death and 
also murdering a third. "e lower People’s Court had ruled that the accused was guilty 
of “the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries” and sentenced him 
to death. Rejecting this compounding of the crime, the Supreme Court described the 
crime of treason in this way:
!e execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the inflic-
tion of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason…when the deed is 
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be 
the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the 
penalty…27
In other words, in the context of an enemy occupation, assuming that adherence to the 
enemy could be demonstrated, the murder of a guerrilla was the treason of murder. It 
was not a traitor who committed a killing but a murder that made the traitor. Why did 
26 All Supreme Court rulings below are from LawPhil. People vs. Eduardo Prieto LawPhil G.R. No. L-399 (January 29, 
1948).
27 Ibid.
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this matter? Besides the fact that the original “complex crime” would have guaranteed 
the harshest punishment, this Supreme Court ruling could be beneficial to the accused 
in other ways. Whereas a murder case required only a single credible witness to convict, 
murder which constituted treason required two, a requirement inherited by Philippine 
law from the treason law of the United States. It also prevented a suspect of being con-
victed of treason for providing aid and comfort to the enemy by accompanying soldiers 
on a raid and then being convicted of a separate count of murder, should the expedition 
have resulted in the death of any guerrillas.
Seen from the perspective of a victim’s call for justice, however, not only did the ruling 
make it more difficult to secure convictions for atrocities because of a two-witness rule 
originally designed to prevent a tyrannical government from overusing accusations of 
treason against its enemies, but the political nature of the offense came to dominate the 
arguments of the court. In each case, it was just as important, from a legal standpoint, to 
establish that the accused, in violation of a “duty of allegiance,” and “for the purpose and 
with the intent of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, did willfully, unlawfully, feloni-
ously and traitorously” carry out each act, rather than to establish all the details of the 
violence itself, since adherence to Japan was as crucial to conviction as the overt act itself. 
In the political crime of treason the primary victim was the nation, and only particular 
brutality shown in a killing, rather than a “less painful method of execution” could serve 
as an aggravating circumstance to increase the penalty.28
In the broader historical terms of an international conflict, rulings on murder as treason 
detached the act from both its common criminal context, and also distinguished it from 
the kind of acts commonly committed by armed parties on all sides in war up to that 
time. Instead, its separate category confirmed the widespread domestic sentiments in 
recently liberated countries around the world in the aftermath of World War II that, dur-
ing an occupation, there were in fact three different kinds of murder by a fellow citizen: 
killing for personal motives, killing for the cause of freedom, and treasonous murder. 
#is may seem to be an obvious and natural division at the social and political levels, but 
in legal terms it was radically different from an approach to wartime violence based on 
the laws of war, either in the decades leading up to World War II, or within the scope of 
the new “crimes against humanity” prosecuted by the war crime courts of Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, and elsewhere. 
Within the weak international legal environment created by the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
conventions and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, violence against those under the control of an occupier was classified according to 
the status of the victim: recognized belligerents treated as prisoners of war after capture, 
non-combatants, and unlawful combatants who were, in the absence of any explicit 
protections, generally subject to military justice, the speed and severity of which not 
28 People vs. Eduardo Prieto G.R. No. L-399 (January 29, 1948) LawPhil.
Universal Crime, Particular Punishment: Trying the Atrocities of the Japanese Occupation as Treason in the Philippines | 67
only varied widely from conflict to conflict and army to army, but often showed a lack 
of consistency within them. 
As in early postwar treason cases in other countries, however, no attempt was made by 
the Philippine courts to make a distinction between the war crime of killing innocent 
civilians and the execution of spies and guerrillas whose lives had never been effectively 
protected by international law.29 When a Makapili auxiliary executed a guerrilla under 
Japanese orders, he was automatically guilty, by accident of birth, of the capital offense 
of treason, while a Japanese soldier might potentially go free under the laws of war for 
the same crime. 
A Crime Political in Nature
As we have seen, a collaborator’s violent acts, including beatings, torture, and the mas-
sacre of civilians were considered not to be separate crimes or even special “complex 
crimes” that compounded sentencing but to themselves be manifestations of treason 
which provided aid to the enemy. In cases of rape or the abduction of women into sexual 
slavery, however, majority rulings of the Philippine Supreme Court held that neither 
acts constituted aid and comfort to the enemy. Instead, they were, at most, relegated to 
aggravating circumstances.
Sexual violence was a prominent feature of Japanese military conquest throughout East 
and Southeast Asia, with some variation, such as the opening stages of the occupation 
of the Dutch East Indies, when the Japanese command demonstrated an ability to limit 
its attacks on women.30 By contrast, the occurrence of rape by Japanese soldiers in the 
Philippines from the earliest stages of the occupation was enough to cause the alarm of 
section chiefs of the Japanese Ministry of War in February, 1942, though the 14 rapes 
they saw as a “considerable” number came nowhere near the prevalence of rape noted in 
accounts of the occupation.31 While a constant part of the campaign of violence and fear 
29 A catch-all principle, known as the “Martens Clause”, found in the preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague con-
ventions calls for “cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and comba-
tants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.” A source of much debate in 
international law, it has been used to argue that unlawful combatants receive protection but according to Ke-
vin Jon Heller, it was not employed in the early postwar war crimes trials. It has, however, become increasingly 
recognized as part of customary international law in recent decades. Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press US, 2011), 209. Yutaka 
Arai, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with 
International Human Rights Law (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 68-71.
30 While Dutch women were targeted for sexual violence, Toshiyuki Tanaka didn’t !nd evidence of rapes of Indone-
sians in the opening stage, where he characterized the Japanese treatment of them as “relatively benign.” Toshiy-
uki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 63.
31 Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Suzanne O’Brien, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World 
War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 78. For a collection of short oral accounts by women and the 
rape they confronted in the Philippines during the occupation see Angelito L. Santos and Renato Constanti-
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in the counterinsurgency campaign against guerrillas throughout the archipelago, the 
widespread rapes during the battle for Manila in February, 1945, were among the many 
war crime counts at the military tribunal of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, held in the 
city later in the fall of the same year, which resulted in his conviction and execution. 
Attempts to reduce the spread of venereal disease and arbitrary acts of sexual violence 
led to the formation of military brothels. According to one 1943 count, over a thousand 
women employed by deception and various degrees of coercion, including many Filipi-
nas directly abducted by Japanese troops, served in these official ‘comfort stations’, while 
many more were taken and held as sex slaves by small isolated army units.32 None of the 
Japanese soldiers or civilians was tried for the operation of the comfort women system, 
but the indictments of Japanese soldiers and civilians for war crimes trials carried out by 
Philippine courts did include 45 counts of rape, the third largest category of war crime 
behind the abuse of civilians (92 counts), and the killing of civilians (134).33
So how did the Supreme Court deal with cases of these atrocities when Filipino collabo-
rators were the perpetrators, or indirectly complicit in the broader Japanese system of 
sex slavery? An example of its approach to sexual violence can be seen in a 1949 ruling 
on 14 counts of treason in the case of a Filipino agent of the Japanese military police, 
Antonio Racaza. Rape was seen only as an aggravating circumstance and not an overt act 
of treason, a finding that would set a precedent for later rulings.34 Racaza’s other violent 
acts, in which he “willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably,” summarily shot, 
beheaded, and strangled suspected guerrillas, tortured detainees during interrogation, 
and guided Japanese soldiers on raids, constituted the very acts of his betrayal of the na-
tion. However, his attempt to rape a woman who refused to offer information during a 
raid was explicitly reduced to aggravating circumstances which were seen as, “deliberately 
augmenting unnecessary wrongs,” without itself constituting an overt act of treason. In 
a separate opinion on the same case, Associate Justice Gregorio Perfecto (served 1945-
1949) concurred with the conviction but argued that the attempted rape should not even 
be considered an aggravating circumstance:
!e attempted rape on the person of Silvina Cabellon may be considered as ground for 
the prosecution of a different offense, but cannot be considered as aggravating treason, a 
no, eds., Under Japanese Rule: Memories and Re!ections (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Inc. 
and BYSCH, Tokyo, 1992), 221-227. The texts of a number of reports of rape in the Philippines that have been 
preserved, along with reports expressing alarm at the negative e"ect these rapes had on Filipino sentiment 
towards the Japanese, can be found in Shiryôshû Nihongun ni miru Sei kanri to Sei bôryoku: Firipin 1941-45 
[Documentary Collection of Sex Management and Sexual Violence as seen by the Japanese Military: Philippines 
1941-45] (Tokyo: Nashinokisha, 2008), 59-73. One of the earliest reports of large-scale rape can be found in the 
January 1 entry in the diary of Pacita Pestaño-Jacinto. Pacita Pestaño-Jacinto, Living with the Enemy: a Diary of 
the Japanese Occupation (Manila: Anvil Pub., 1999), 14.
32 Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, 47.
33 Hitoshi Nagai, Firipin to tainichi senpan saiban 1945–1953 [The War Crimes Trials and Japan-Philippines Rela-
tions, 1945–1953] (Tôkyô: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), 220. The fourth, #fth and sixth largest number of counts were 
for the burning or destruction of property (23), looting (18) and cannibalism (15).
34 People vs. Antonio Racaza G.R. No. L-365 (January 21, 1949) LawPhil.
Universal Crime, Particular Punishment: Trying the Atrocities of the Japanese Occupation as Treason in the Philippines | 69
crime political in nature. In the attempted rape there was nothing political and it had 
nothing to do with defendant’s adherence and aid to the enemy.35
Justice Perfecto was here trying to make a distinction between common crimes and the 
uniquely political crime that was treason. Sexual violence in war against a suspected 
guerrilla was not, he argued, like beatings, torture, or the killing of civilians, which 
constituted political crimes that provided aid and comfort to the enemy. Rape was thus 
neither treason nor a war crime but, alone among the acts of violence in this wartime 
context, considered a common crime. 
If the court held that rapes did not themselves constitute acts of treasonous violence then 
neither would the abduction of women into sexual slavery. !e Philippine Supreme Court 
ruling in the case against one Susano “Kid” Perez, which would also become a precedent 
in similar cases, offers an unusually detailed justification for the position that complicity 
in securing sexual slaves for the occupation forces did not constitute acts of treason.36 It 
also offered a remarkable dissenting opinion, which revealed the glaring inconsistency in 
the court’s argument. In all six counts of treason Perez was accused of “commandeering” 
women to serve as sexual slaves for Japanese officers, and sometimes raping the women 
himself. In some cases, deception was employed, as when Perez summoned women for 
the purported purpose of providing testimony against some accused suspect, or when he 
attempted to convince a reluctant woman who had already escaped once that a Japanese 
colonel merely wanted her to be his secretary. According to testimony in the trial, the 
same colonel would go on to rape or enslave more than half a dozen women provided for 
him by Perez. In one of the counts, Perez took a woman he had delivered to the Japanese 
colonel directly from one rape encounter to an uninhabited house where he then raped 
the traumatized woman himself. On other occasions, Perez abducted women from their 
homes and delivered them to banquets and dances where those who were “selected” were 
subsequently raped by Japanese officers in attendance. Even nurses working in the Cebu 
provincial hospital were targeted for these “invitations” at gunpoint.37
Perez appealed the treason conviction and its death sentence without denying any of the 
findings in the accounts. In his opposing brief the Solicitor General argued that the ac-
tions of Perez constituted treason because his acts helped the Japanese to “maintain and 
preserve the morale of the soldiers.” !e majority of Supreme Court judges disagreed. 
!eir reasoning is worth quoting at some length:
!e law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse 
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants… What aid 
and comfort constitute[s] treason must depend upon their nature, degree and purpose… 
As [a] general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies 
35 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
36 People vs. Susano Perez G.R. L-856 (April 18, 1949) LawPhil. Steinberg has also pointed out that this case set the 
precedent that securing women was not treason, see Philippine Collaboration, 155.
37 LawPhil People vs. Susano Perez
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must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in ad-
dition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs… His “commandeering” 
of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment 
held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment 
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty 
any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly 
had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations 
with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or 
to weaken the power of the United State[s]…Whatever favorable effect the defendant’s 
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, 
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime 
of treason…38
!is same argument employed by the court could also, of course, protect women who 
would be accused of treason for their relationships with the Japanese, whether they were 
intimate or not; and whether they were willing or were involved in varying degrees of 
coercion.39 However, Perez, who freely admitted accusations that he had violently co-
erced women, deceived them, and knowingly participated in the procurement of sexual 
slaves for Japanese officers, would not receive any punishment for those specific acts, 
which were dismissed as “trivial, imperceptible and unintentional” in their effect. !e 
judges never fully confronted the fact that Perez was not simply procuring reluctant 
dance partners for the Japanese but knowingly facilitating their rape. !e death sentence 
and treason convictions were overturned, to be replaced with a conviction on only four 
counts of rape and a 10-17 year sentence for those encounters in which Perez directly 
attacked the women himself.
Associate Justice Guillermo Pablo (served 1945–1955), who had served as a judge in 
Cebu before the war and was one of the few Supreme Court judges at the time who had 
not served in it during the occupation, offered a lone dissenting opinion in this case.40 
He quoted from the Solicitor General’s brief a rather uncomfortable comparison be-
tween the role of the United Services Organization (U.S.O.) in providing entertainment 
for the U.S. army in the Philippines and the “entertainment” provided for the Japanese 
Imperial forces. It appeared incomprehensible to him how the provision of women for 
the enemy could not be seen as an example of aid and comfort in wartime, and therefore 
treasonous. Pablo did not dance around the issue of the rape of the women who testified, 
and did not speak only in more vague terms of “entertainment.” Instead, the violation of 
Philippine women was seen by Pablo as very much a “crime political in nature.” How-
38 Ibid.
39 For the cases of Philippine women, including ‘comfort women’ being tried for treason for relations with the 
Japanese see Florina Yamsuan Orilos, “Preliminary Pro!le of Women ‘Collaborators’ in the People‘s Court Records,” 
Philippine Social Sciences Review 57(1) ( 2010): 181–220.
40 Overview of Pablo‘s career on the Philippine Supreme Court E-Library http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/supreme-
courtjustices/associatejustice/59 (accessed 1 January, 2013).
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ever, by conceding its political nature, Pablo shifted the focus from the women who were 
the victims of violence we would today clearly identify as war crimes in order to argue 
that the crimes of rape and sexual slavery were an affront to the nation itself. He asked 
rhetorically whether there could be any greater treason than such acts. “"ey took over 
all of our resource production: everything in their path, but, by God, save the honor of 
our women.”41
"e fact that these sexual crimes of war were treated differently in the treason trials than 
the other crimes is a reminder that legal systems around the world, including that of 
early postwar Philippines, had yet to grapple fully with the relationship between acts 
of sexual violence and the environment of war. In the early postwar trials, the comfort 
system of sexual enslavement, which involved thousands of women throughout Japanese 
occupied areas, received the dedicated attention of a court only in the 1948 Batavia 
Military Tribunal trying Japanese for the rape and forced prostitution of one particu-
lar group of Dutch women.42 Forced prostitution was a prosecutable crime along with 
rape and did find mention in trials records elsewhere. However, it was often buried in 
testimony that covered a wide range of atrocities, such as descriptions of the abduction 
of women into sexual slavery for German officers in Smolensk and in the nearby village 
of Bassmanova.43 Mention of the high incidence of rape also appeared in the testimony 
of the war crimes trials in Tokyo and elsewhere, especially in relation to the atrocities in 
Nanjing after its capture in December, 1937. However, overall after World War II sexual 
assaults were given far less direct attention in terms of actual prosecutions.44 
"e Philippine Supreme Court was, as in all treason cases, not evaluating the issue in 
terms of the international laws of war but in a domestic legal context in which the sole 
choice was between the common crime of rape and the capital crime of treason. Reject-
ing the “political” nature of the crimes did not remove the possibility of punishment for 
some sexual crimes but it was a telling exception, given its other rulings which held all 
forms of violence in the service of the occupier as treason. 
As the dissenting opinion of Justice Pablo suggests, “nationalizing” the crime of rape by 
including it as a form of treason would not have necessarily brought Philippine society 
any closer to confronting the issues of rape and sexual enslavement as weapons of war 
and expressions of occupation power. Instead of focusing on the women who survived 
the sexual violence, punishment for their enslavement in the form of a treason charge 
could easily transform the issue into a violation of the nation’s honor. It would not be 
until the wars of Yugoslavia in the 1990s that the full range of these issues would begin 
to receive considerable attention in the academic, legal, and social realms.
41 People vs. Susano Perez (alias Kid Perez), G.R. L-856 (April 18, 1949), LawPhil.
42 Kelly Dawn Askin War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals (Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijho! Publishers, 1997), 85. Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: the Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of 
World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 14.
43 Askin, War Crimes Against Women, 66, 72. Theodor Meron, “Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian 
Law,” The American Journal of International Law 87.3 (December, 1993), 426.
44 See Ibid., 98. 
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War Crimes Trials and the 1953 Pardons
!e treason trials in the Philippines were carried out alongside the war crimes trials for 
Japanese occupation forces in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1947 American military 
courts tried war criminals, who were charged with conventional crimes of war (category 
B) and of the new crimes against humanity (category C), including the famous trials of 
generals Yamashita Tomoyuki and Homma Masaharu.45 Numbering almost a hundred 
trials, and continuing after Philippine independence in 1946, they resulted in a 90% con-
viction rate and 69 executions.46 Philippine-run war crimes trials under a National War 
Crimes Office began in August, 1947, and continued until December, 1949, convicting 
138 Japanese soldiers and civilians out of 155 total arraigned in the trials, and sentenc-
ing some 79 of them to death.47 !ree executions were carried out in 1948 and over two 
years later, in January, 1951, another 14 were suddenly put to death. In the months that 
followed, sympathy for the plight of those imprisoned grew rapidly among the Japanese 
public, and Japanese, American, and even Chinese diplomatic representatives placed di-
rect and indirect pressure on the Philippine government to put an end to the executions, 
and to consider a return of the remaining prisoners to Japan.48 Domestically, leading oc-
cupation period officials such as former Makapili vice-Supremo Pio Duran and Senator 
Camilo Osias, who had both benefited from the 1948 amnesty, were active in supporting 
moves to release the Japanese war criminals.49 Massive petition drives within Japan even-
tually totaling millions of signatures showed the breadth of mobilization efforts behind 
the issue, but there were concerns within the Philippines that Japanese war reparations 
to the Philippines would become tied to fate of the war criminals.50 
On June 27, 1953, President Quirino announced that many Japanese war criminals 
would be among those included in his annual presidential pardons. !e pardons took 
effect on 4 July and the decree would eventually lead to the return to Japan of 106 war 
criminals. However, while the pardons of the Japanese had the most significant interna-
tional impact, they did not compose the largest number of individuals on the list of these 
1953 pardons. Hundreds of Filipinos convicted of treason would also go free.51
45 On the U.S. military trials in the Philippines, and especially the importance of the Yamashita trial see Lael, The 
Yamashita Precedent.
46 There were 97 trials and 92 sentenced to death, but only 69 executed. Chamberlain, Justice and Reconciliation, 
53. Some 140 out of about 150 Japanese war criminal suspects were convicted. Nagai Firipin to tainichi senpan 
saiban, 200. See Chamberlain’s Appendix 1 for a list of cases and outcomes, Chamberlain, Justice and Reconcili-
ation, 235-247.
47 Ibid., 70.
48 Ibid., 151-180.
49 Ibid., 177. Duran was well known for his support for the Japanese war e!ort and was one of the leading o"cials 
of the Makapili. Grant K. Goodman, “Pio Duran and Philippine Japanophilism,” Historian 32(2) (1970): 228-242.
50 Chamberlain, Justice and Reconciliation, 151-2. 
51 The news was reported internationally as a side note. For example, “President Quirino also announced that 350 
Filipinos convicted as wartime collaborators would be pardoned.” See: “Philippines to Free Japanese Captives,” 
New York Times (June 28, 1953), 2. 
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On July 4, 1953, 323 names of convicted traitors who were to be released that day were 
published.52 !e day the collaborators were released the American communist and a 
leading Huk fighter, who had been captured the year before, William Pomeroy, watched 
them make their way to freedom from the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa pris-
on.53
As prisoners, the collaborators have been tolerated, their identities blurred in the orange 
mass of the prison population, but on the day the released group marches to the control 
gate, carrying their rolled-up possessions, the memory of their wartime behavior surges 
back. From the upper windows of buildings, water and missiles are poured down upon 
the collaborators. Prisoners strain at the bars, screaming, “Taksil! Taksil!” (Traitor! Trai-
tor!). !ere is more respect for the thief and murderer here than for the traitor.54
When the 1948 amnesty argued that “public sentiment did not extend” to those who 
waged war on the Philippines and carried out atrocities against the people, it set aside 
some acts of violence as fundamentally different in nature. It did this in a fashion not 
entirely dissimilar from the way war crimes trials around the world after World War II, 
including the Philippines, similarly struggled to create and foster an understanding of 
a universally prohibited violence. However, the trials for treasonous atrocities and war 
crimes trials differed in two fundamental ways: the retributive process created this space, 
or attempted to create this space, at the conclusion of a process of elimination rather than 
an active attempt to confront the horrors of the war as such. 
Second, in each case, the violence at the heart of the charges was, as we have seen, ever-
clouded by the primary crime they were judged for: a violation of an allegiance to the 
nation. When William Pomeroy noted that the traitors who walked out of prison on that 
July day in 1953 were more despised than thieves and murderers, one might have noted 
that almost all of those released by President Quirino’s pardons were convicted of the 
treason of murder; each held responsible for the deaths of their countrymen at their own 
or Japanese hands, as a result of their collaboration.
Even if the violent crimes in the Philippine trials are considered without the obscuring 
veil of the treason charges that encapsulated them, the rules of the game when it came to 
command responsibility differed significantly from the most noteworthy war crimes trial 
held in the archipelago: the prosecution of General Yamashita Tomoyuki by a U.S. mili-
tary court for the atrocities of his men. !e Yamashita case of late 1945, which resulted 
in his conviction and execution, established a principle of strict liability in command 
responsibility for war crimes that would not be approached again in law until the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and not tested in the courts 
52 The clipping from the July 4, 1953 issue of the Manila Times was an attachment to “List of Names of Filipino 
Prisoners Pardoned by President QUIRINO on July 4, 1953” (July 21, 1953) 796.00/7-1053 RG 59.
53 Pomeroy was a Communist Party USA education secretary in New York before World War II and wrote about 
his experiences !ghting with the Huks in William J. Pomeroy, The Forest, a Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla 
Struggle in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1963).
54 William J. Pomeroy, Bilanggo: Life as a Political Prisoner in the Philippines, 1952–1962 (Manila: UP Press, 2009), 80.
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until the later stages of the war crimes trials in the former Yugoslavia.55 Judges in the 
Yamashita case held that he could only have been ignorant of the widespread atrocities 
committed by soldiers under his command if this ignorance was a willing one.56 How-
ever, the high bar set for treason convictions in the Philippines virtually guaranteed that 
any distance between the violence and the accused would result in a dismissal. Instead, 
the “small fry” collaborators who were patronizingly referred to as the “ignorant simple-
minded credulous Filipino,” by congressman Lorenzo Sumulong in the 1948 debates 
over how broad the amnesty for treason should be, carried out their daily interactions 
with the Japanese occupier within earshot of the screams of the tortured, and as witnesses 
or themselves participants in the executions.57 
When they evaded responsibility by claiming to be, “just following orders” to cooper-
ate with the Japanese military, or to join in the urgent task of eradicating the “bandits” 
throughout the land, these excuses were, in the majority of cases, dismissed by the Su-
preme Court, as they were in the trials of Japanese or other Axis war criminals. However, 
unlike the trials of Axis power officers and political leaders, the responsibility for the 
atrocities that came with military collaboration rarely extended beyond the immediate 
scene of the crime.
"is was a matter of course for those “political collaborators”, who were civilian heads 
of military organizations but who were not close to their day-to-day operations such 
as President Jose P. Laurel, who organized wartime “pacification” committees, and Pio 
Duran, who was nominally vice-supremo of the Makapili. However, it was just as true 
for leading military commanders. "e surviving former head of the wartime Bureau 
of Constabulary, Guillermo Francisco, was acquitted, even though his “double game” 
behavior did not prevent him from overseeing “pacification” campaigns that resulted in 
atrocities. Even more remarkable was the inability to account for any kind of command 
responsibility in the trial of the head of the wartime Manila police, Antonio Torres. 
Francisco might have, albeit feebly, argued that the national scope of the Constabulary 
was such that he was completely ignorant of the fact that many of his units, even those 
who maintained strong connections to some resistance forces, were actively engaged in 
the suppression of Huks and other guerrillas, regularly employed torture, and that some 
units carried out summary executions. It is far harder to imagine that Torres could have 
55 Charles Garraway, “The Doctrine of Command Responsibility” in Doria, José, Hans-Peter Gasser, and M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, eds., The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blish-
chenko. (Hague: Brill, 2009), 713-723. The most infamous example of how far the liability of command responsi-
bility had weakened in the decades after WWII is the 1971 failure to prosecute Captain Ernest Medina following 
the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.
56 Bruce D. Landrum, “The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now,” Military Law Re-
view 149 (Summer 1995): 296. Landrum argues that two Nuremberg Trials of 1948 weakened command re-
sponsibility by adjusting the requirement from the idea that the o!cers “must have known” to a “should have 
known” standard, and thus “a commander’s knowledge of widespread atrocities within the command area was 
rebuttably presumed rather than irrebuttably presumed.” ibid., 298. This less harsh “should have known” standard 
is the one that is generally used by the International Criminal Court today.
57 Philippines Congressional Record: House of Representatives v. 3 no. 13 (Feb. 11, 1948), 243.
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been wartime Manila police chief without being aware of the extensive cooperation be-
tween his officers and the Japanese military police, or their responsibility for the torture 
and execution of suspects being carried out by the secret service division of the Manila 
Police Department.58 
As in the case of Francisco, the case against Torres was dismissed even before the 1948 
amnesty. "is exoneration of wartime guilt so emboldened the former police chief that he 
immediately proceeded to petition for the removal of his replacement, Eduardo Quintos, 
so that he might be rightfully restored as chief of police. "e mayor of Manila turned 
down his request in 1948, but Torres pressed his case with a letter to President Quirino 
and then directly brought a legal case against police chief Quintos. "e Supreme Court 
itself ruled on the case in April 1951, when the majority opinion rejected his arguments 
without noting the boldness of the claimant.59
Beyond the Trials and Beyond Trial
Even if a principle of command responsibility had been adopted, establishing liability 
on either a narrow or broad level, the limited treason trials of military collaborators and 
perpetrators of atrocities could not hope to offer anything close to a full reckoning with 
the wartime, precisely because collaborators had no monopoly on these acts. "e bru-
tality of some guerrillas rivaled that of the worst atrocities of the occupying forces and 
their domestic allies. "e American Ray Hunt, who became a mid-level guerrilla leader 
in Luzon, had great respect for the conduct of some of his fellow resistance leaders, but 
reserved harsh judgment for many of those who claimed to have joined the war against 
occupation,
Many a Filipino “guerilla” was concerned mostly to take advantage of current confusion 
to avenge himself on old enemies, destroy some rival family, betray a political foe to the 
Japanese, or simply to indulge a taste for sadism. Cruel as the Japanese were to everyone 
else, cruel as some despicable Americans were to suspected Filipino collaborators, nobody 
exceeded the savageries various depraved Filipinos inflicted on their own countrymen.60
Hunt struggled with the moral consequences of his own command responsibility. Some 
guerrillas under his command captured a spy who, in a public display to impress some 
villagers, was bled to death, roasted, and eaten. Hunt was disgusted but took no action 
against them, since “to have executed the whole guerrilla troop responsible would have 
demoralized all my men…”61 "ough responsible for a more horrifying scale of violence, 
similar words could have easily been uttered by Colonel Nagahama Akira, head of the 
military police in the occupied Philippines. 
58 See for example testimony in People vs. Pedro Santos Balangit, G.R. L-1298 (May 31, 1949), LawPhil.
59 People vs. Antonio C. Torres, G.R. L-3304 (April 5, 1951), LawPhil.
60 Hunt and Norling, Behind Japanese Lines, 72.
61 Ibid., 127.
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During his American military war crimes trial Nagahama claimed that, despite an at-
tempt to ban torture and enforce a more humane policy towards prisoners, “the tremen-
dous weight of the forces which worked against any possible materialization of the good 
intentions I possessed,” robbed him of success and “each day that passed strengthened the 
hands of those who from the outset could not bring themselves to follow a course other 
than outright force and the imposition of fear.”62 !ere was little evidence of Nagahama’s 
attempts to limit the widespread brutality, and his own claim to be a feeble “shield” was 
justifiably dismissed by the court. Nor has his argument earned the sympathy of many 
historians. However, it is worth reminding ourselves that the crimes seen as an affront 
to the dignity of all humanity in early postwar courts that war criminals like Nagahama 
were convicted of, were treated differently when the accused were either his Filipino allies 
or guerrilla opponents in contemporary courts, and continue to be remembered within 
a distinctly separate historical discourse. 
Trials to punish the atrocities of Filipino citizens who served alongside the Japanese oc-
cupation appear almost nowhere in postwar histories of the Philippines, which usually 
conclude any discussion with the amnesty that excluded those most likely to be directly 
responsible for serious crimes of war. Wartime violence, tried in regular criminal courts 
under the laws of treason, took place outside the legal environment prosecuting war 
crimes around the world that referred to an emerging set of global legal practices, princi-
ples, and precedents. Citizenship alone, the only form of identity which mattered in the 
trials of those accused, transformed their atrocities into manifestations of their national 
betrayal and, as we have seen, this had direct consequences on their prosecution. 
!ough distinct from war crimes trials, however, this seemingly more localized process 
was no less global. Margherita Zanasi has shown the ways in which collaborationist trials 
in China played a similar political role and gave rise to many contemporary compari-
sons with the same process in France, and especially the trial of Vichy leader Philippe 
Pétain.63 In many of the countries that emerged from occupation in 1945, the process of 
punishing collaborators accused of responsibility for acts of rape, torture, and massacre 
developed in a legal space that, like war crimes trials, suffered from a weak foundation. 
Outdated treason laws, or newly written ones, were summoned to prosecute disloyalty, 
but in former colonies such as India, the Philippines, and Korea, among others, there 
was also the awkward question of what nation really commanded legitimate loyalty at 
the moment alleged crimes of treason occurred. However, these trials need to be evalu-
ated, not only as an arena for nationalist politics and purification, but as a process for 
retribution against extreme violence. As the trials discussed above show in the case of the 
Philippines, the primary focus on identity, loyalty, and the nation as the primary victim 
62 Quoted in Syjuco, Kempei Tai in the Philippines, 83. Original in U.S.A. vs. Akira Nagahama, Japanese War Crimes 
Trials, Bundle No. 74 Vol. XII, pp. 22-23, Philippine National Archives, Manila.
63 Margherita Zanasi, “Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration,” 
The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 1, 2008): 731–751. For similar references to European trials in the 
Philippines see Konrad Lawson “Wartime Atrocities,” 168, 204.
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submitted atrocities to charges of treason poorly equipped to confront the horrors of 
war.
